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ESSAY 
A MAlTER OF EVIDENCE OR OF LAW? 
BAlTERED WOMEN CLAIMING SELF-
DEFENSE IN CALIFORNIA 
Rachel A. Van Cleave* 
lNrRODUCI'lON 
Domestic violence is a nationwide concern.1 The problem of 
domestic violence is of particular concern to women. The statis-
tics overwhelmingly demonstrate that the vast majority of the 
victims of domestic violence are women.2 Thirty to fifty percent 
of all women murdered are killed by their male partners.3 In an 
attempt to alleviate this violence, California has adopted meas-
ures which focus on the behavior of the batterer. For example, 
California provides procedures by which victims of domestic vio-
lence can obtain restraining orders against their batterers, as well 
as other measures.4 Such measures are extremely important and 
* Visiting Assistant Professor, University of Richmond School of Law. B.A. 
Stanford University, 1986; J.D. Hastings College of the Law, 1989; J.S.M. Stanford 
Law School, 1994. The author thanks Professor Miguel Mendez for insightful com-
ments and suggestions, Roberta K. Thyfault for helpful materials and information, 
Michael G. Montgomery for excellent research assistance, and Joseph Schottland for 
editorial and other support. 
1. Violence Against Women Act of 1993, H.R. 1133, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1994) (authorizing federal monies to encourage arrests of batterers, for example). 
See also Women and Violence: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 
101st Cong., 2d Sess. 110-16 (1990) (testimony of Angela Browne, Ph.D.). 
2. See Developments in the Law - Legal Responses to Domestic Violence, 106 
HARV. L. REv. 1498, 1501 nn.1-5 (1993). 
3. Cal. S.B. 1144, 1993-94 Reg. Sess. § l(a) (50%); Developments in the Law, 
supra note 2, at 1501 n.5 (30%); Nancy Gibbs, 'Til Death Do Us Part, TIME, Jan. 18, 
1993, at 38, 41 (30-50%). 
4. CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 6200 et seq. (West 1994). One important aspect of this 
law is that it outlines the imposition of restraining orders against batterers. See CAL. 
PENAL CODE § 262 (West 1994) (defining spousal rape); CAL. PENAL CODE § 602(u) 
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California must continue to pursue them. However, where these 
measures fail to prevent the repeated battery of victims, a bat-
tered woman may resort to violence herself in an effort to save 
her own life. 
When a woman kills her batterer she must be given a fair 
opportunity to present a claim of self-defense to a jury. The most 
controversial cases involve battered women who kill their batter-
ers in "non-traditional confrontational" settings,S because courts 
have difficulty finding that danger of death or bodily injury to the 
woman was imminent.6 Currently, such women face numerous 
hurdles to fully presenting their self-defense claims. Traditional 
self-defense law permits a defendant to present evidence of prior 
threats made by the batterer-victim against the defendant's life 
and safety.7 She can also present instances of prior violence or 
abuse she suffered at the hands of her batterer.8 But such evi-
dence is usually insufficient to establish the reasonableness of her 
use of self-defense in a non-traditional confrontational setting, 
due to the requirement that danger be imminent before self-de-
fense is permitted. Furthermore, where the woman has killed in 
a non-traditional confrontational setting, some courts have de-
cided that she did not act in self-defense as a matter of law and 
thus find such evidence irrelevant.9 For example, when a bat-
tered woman kills in reaction to her batterer picking up a beer 
(West 1994) (including the refusal to leave a battered women's shelter in the defini-
tion of "trespass"); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1000.91 et seq. (West 1994) (allowing re-
ferral of those charged with acts involving domestic violence to approved batterer's 
programs). 
5. This phrase is borrowed from Phyllis L. Crocker, The Meaning of Equality 
for Battered Women Who Kill Men in Self-Defense, 8 HARV. WOMEN'S Ll. 121, 139 
(1985) (noting that Battered Woman's Syndrome expert testimony is often excluded 
when the woman has killed in a non-traditional, confrontational situation). 
6. People v. Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. 167, 175 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989); see also State v. 
Stewart, 763 P.2d 572, 577 (Kan. 1988); State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8,13-16 (N.C. 
1989). But see State v. Hennum, 441 N.W.2d 793, 798 (Minn. 1989). 
7. See People v. Bush, 148 Cal. Rptr. 430, 436 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978) (holding 
that the trial court erred in not instructing the jury to consider prior threats as rele-
vant to the reasonableness of defendant's exercise of self-defense); see also People v. 
Moore, 275 P.2d 485, 490 (Cal. 1954). 
8. See People v. Yokum, 302 P.2d 406, 497 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1956) (holding 
that the trial court erred in excluding evidence of the decedent's prior threats and 
violent conduct toward the defendant who claimed she killed in self-defense). 
9. See Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 179 (finding that the defendant was not entitled 
to a "perfect" self-defense jury instruction, but that the expert testimony could sup-
port an instruction for "imperfect" self-defense). For a discussion of the difference 
between perfect and imperfect self-defense, see infra note 28 and accompanying 
text. 
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bottle, she does not kill in a traditional confrontational setting.10 
Similarly, where she kills her sleeping batterer in reaction to ear-
lier death threats by the batterer, the setting is not traditionally 
confrontational.ll 
The findings stated in a bill pending before the California 
Legislature indicate that at least some members of the Legisla-
ture acknowledge that self-defense law as it is currently inter-
preted by the courts is inadequate to deal with the situations in 
which a battered woman kills her batterer. The bill reports that 
"[o]ne half of all women murdered in the United States are mur-
dered by domestic partners or former domestic partners. "12 The 
bill explains that "[i]n many situations women who are subject to 
repeated patterns of violence by their domestic partners are un-
able to flee from the relationship because of intimidation, threats 
of physical violence, ... which cause these women to be, in effect, 
victims of false imprisonment."13 Finally, it states that "[s]tudies 
have shown that the intimidation and threats of violence that 
make these women victims of felony false imprisonment are real 
and that women are most likely to be murdered when attempting 
to report abuse or to leave an abusive relationship. "14 The bill 
concludes that the 
current law of justifiable homicide . . . does not allow these 
women to claim self-defense because the practical effect of the 
'reasonable person' standard imposed upon jurors results in 
their finding that these women are not entitled to justifiable 
homicide defenses because they did not attempt to escape 
what they actually perceived as imminent danger.1s 
The bill proposes to alter existing self-defense doctrine by, essen-
tially, creating a separate defense for victims of abuse. 
Some commentators argue that the situation of a battered 
woman who kills her batterer does not fit into traditional self-
defense law because the law of self-defense was developed by 
10. State v. Hundley, 693 P.2d 475, 479 (Kan. 1985) (holding that the use of the 
word "immediate" rather than "imminent" in jury instructions had the effect of pre-
cluding the jury from considering prior abuse inflicted by the decedent with beer 
bottles, requiring a reversal of the defendant's conviction). 
11. Aris,264 Cal. Rptr. at 171. After a vicious beating, he told her that he did 
not think she would live until the morning and she killed him while he slept. Her 
conviction of second degree murder was upheld. Id. 
12. See Cal. S.B. 1144, supra note 3, § l(a). 
13. Id. § l(b). 
14. Id. § l(c). 
15. Id. § l(e). 
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men and with masculine confontational settings in mind.16 The 
focus of such discussions tends to be on the requirement that a 
defendant's use of self-defense be reasonable. These commenta-
tors suggest relaxing this objective standard, arguing that it is not 
truly objectiveP Some propose a "reasonable battered woman" 
standard.1s Criticism of this approach includes claims that it will 
result in a stereotyping of women and will require all women 
who claim they killed in self-defense to prove that they were also 
battered women.19 Other commentators argue that the problem 
is not with the elements and definitions of self-defense, but 
rather with how those rules are applied by courts.20 I agree that 
there should not be a separate self-defense law for either women 
or battered women. Nor should there be exceptions to tradi-
tional self-defense doctrine when a woman or a battered woman 
is a defendant. However, courts should not unduly restrict evi-
dentiary rules and elements of self-defense when a battered wo-
man kills her batterer while he sleeps, as occurred in People v. 
Aris.21 
This essay examines the obstacles battered women face in 
the form of evidentiary rules and in the definitions of certain ele-
ments of self-defense, focusing specifically on the appellate court 
opinion in Aris. The essay then evaluates existing and pending 
legislation in California which has sought to undo the narrowing 
effected by Aris. Finally, the essay proposes statutory language 
which would be more effective in ensuring that battered women 
who kill their batterers in non-traditional confrontational situa-
tions may fully present their claims of self-defense. Where a de-
fendant claims self-defense and presents evidence regarding the 
Battered Woman Syndrome ("BWS"), my proposal would re-
16. See CYNTIiIA GILLESPIE, JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDE 31-49 (1989) (stating that 
the law of self-defense was originally intended to handle barroom brawls and attacks 
by strangers during the perpetration of a crime); see also Alison M. Madden, Clem-
ency for Battered Women Who Kill Their Abusers: Finding a Just Forum, 4 HASTINGS 
WOMEN'S LJ. 1, 22-25 (1993). 
17. See Cal. S.B. 1144, supra note 3, § l(a). 
18. See, e.g., Kit Kinports, Defending Battered Women's Self-Defense Claims, 67 
OR. L. REv. 393, 415-22 (1988). 
19. See Crocker, supra note 5, at 144-46 (citing State v. Kelly, 655 P.2d 1202, 
1203 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 685 P.2d 564 (Wash. 1984) 
(seeming to conclude that in order to aquit the defendant the jury had to find that 
she was a battered woman and that she acted in self-defense». 
20. See Holly Maguigan, Battered Women and Self-Defense: Myths and Miscon-
ceptions in Current Reform Proposals, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 379, 432-37 (1991). 
21. 264 Cal. Rptr. 167 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989). 
1994] BATTERED WOMAN'S SYNDROME 221 
quire judges to instruct juries to consider such testimony when 
evaluating the reasonableness of the defendant's use of self-de-
fense. Furthermore, where the defendant alternatively argues 
for "imperfect" self-defense, the proposal clarifies the definition 
of "imminence" to be whether the defendant actually believed 
the danger to her life was imminent. 
I. SELF-DEFENSE AND BA'ITERED WOMAN SYNDROME 
In California, murder is defined as "the unlawful killing of a 
human being ... with malice aforethought."22 One way to prove 
that the defendant acted with malice is to show that "no consid-
erable provocation" was present.23 The Penal Code provides 
that murder is excused when "committed ... in the heat of pas-
sion, upon any sudden and sufficient provocation."24 Thus, the 
presence of sufficient provocation mitigates murder to man-
slaughter, while its absence is one way to prove the element of 
malice aforethought under California law.25 Murder is justified 
"[w]hen committed in the lawful defense of [the defendant] ... , 
when there is reasonable ground to apprehend a design to com-
mit a felony or to do some great bodily injury, and imminent 
danger of such design being accomplished."26 This defense has 
been interpreted as requiring the defendant to show that she 
honestly (or actually) believed she had to defend herself and that 
a reasonable person in the same circumstances would have be-
lieved that self-defense was necessary.27 Where a defendant kills 
in the honest and reasonable belief that she needs to defend her-
self, she acts with justification and must be found not gUilty. The 
California Supreme Court has held that where a defendant 
charged with murder is able to prove that she honestly believed 
self-defense was necessary, but fails to satisfy the reasonableness 
requirement, she establishes "imperfect self-defense" and is 
guilty only of manslaughter.28 
22. CAL. PENAL CODE § 187(a) (West 1988). 
23. Id. § 188. 
24. Id. § 195(2). 
25. See PHILLIP E. JOHNSON, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXT 
159-62 (4th ed. 1990). 
26. CAL. PENAL CODE § 197(3) (West 1988). 
27. People v. Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. 167, 172 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989); see also People 
v. Williams, 142 Cal. Rptr. 704, 709 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977). 
28. In re Christian S., 872 P.2d 574 (Cal. 1994) (holding that the California Leg-
islature did not eliminate "imperfect self-defense" in amendments to the penal 
code); People v. Flannel, 603 P.2d 1, 7 (Cal. 1979) (holding that the existence of an 
honest but unreasonable belief in the need for self-defense is inconsistent with the 
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A battered woman charged with the murder of her batterer 
may attempt to bolster her claim that she killed in self-defense by 
introducing evidence of the BWS. BWS is not, in and of itself, a 
defense to murder,29 nor is it a disease.3o Rather, it describes a 
set of circumstances in which any woman might find herself. 
BWS evidence can help a jury to evaluate a battered woman's 
claim of self-defense. An expert on BWS can describe to the jury 
the three phase cycle of violence characteristic of BWS.31 The 
first, "tension-building" phase, consists of minor batterings by 
the woman's intimate partner, such as slaps, as well as psycholog-
ical abuse such ~s name-calling and other verbal abuse.32 This 
phase is followed by an "acute battering incident" consisting of 
an uncontrollable release of tension and is distinguished by its 
"savagery, destructiveness, and uncontrolled nature."33 It is dur-
ing this second phase that the woman suffers the most severe 
physical injuries. The batterer inflicts serious physical injury in 
any number of ways. He pushes her down stairs breaking her 
ribs,34 he uses his fists to beat her,35 or he employs other weap-
ons, such as hammers,36 or steel-toed boots.37 He might also 
abuse her sexually, forcing her to submit to sado-masochistic sex-
ual acts.38 The third phase, the "loving contrition phase," follows 
the acute battering incident.39 During this phase the batterer 
might promise to stop beating the woman,40 beg her forgiveness, 
malice element of Penal Code § 187). The honest but unreasonable belief doctrine 
has also been called either "imperfect" or "partial" self-defense. 
29. GILLESPIE, supra note 16, at 159. However, sometimes courts refer to the 
syndrome as the "battered wife defense." See State v. Anaya, 456 A.2d 1255, 1266 
(Me. 1983). 
30. LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATI'ERED WOMAN SYNDROME 20-21 (1979); 
see also Michael Dowd, Dispelling the Myths About the "Battered Woman's De-
fense": Towards a New Understanding, 19 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 567, 578 (1992) (ar-
guing that BWS should be viewed as "the responses and characteristics of a normal 
woman who finds herself in a defective or dysfunctional relationship"); Kinports, 
supra note 18, at 417 n.90. 
31. LENORE E. WALKER, TERRIFYING LoVE: WHY BATI'ERED WOMEN KILL 
AND How SOCIETY RESPONDS 42 (1989). 
32. [d. 
33. [d. at 43. 
34. See State v. Hundley, 693 P.2d 475, 475 (Kan. 1985). 
35. See Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626, 629 (D.C. 1979). 
36. See Commonwealth v. Craig, 783 S.W.2d 387, 388 (Ky. 1990), overruled by 
Dyer v. Commonwealth, 816 S.W.2d 647 (Ky. 1991). 
37. See State v. Hennum, 441 N.W.2d 793, 795 (Minn. 1989). 
38. See Fielder v. State, 756 S.W.2d 309, 311 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988), rev'd on other 
grounds, 834 S.W.2d 509 (Tex. 1992); see also WALKER, supra note 30, at 47-51. 
39. WALKER, supra note 31, at 44. 
40. See State v. Hundley, 693 P.2d 475, 477 (Kan. 1985). 
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and even admit that he has a problem.41 However, in" many bat-
tering relationships, this phase becomes shorter and shorter in 
duration, amounting to simply a cessation of violence.42 It is this 
third phase that gives the battered woman hope that he will 
change which "provides positive reinforcement for [her] remain-
ing in the relationship."43 
The expert can also explain why, in many situations, a bat-
t~red woman does not leave the violent relationship, or even 
seek help.44 The notion of staying in a relationship fraught with 
violence is incomprehensible to most jurors who have not lived in 
such a relationship.45 An expert might explain to the jury rea-
sons why a battered woman might stay in such a relationship, and 
that such women do not remain in the relationship because they 
enjoy the beatings.46 An expert can explain that any woman 
could find herself in a battering relationship: "[t]here is no 
predisposing prototype for these [battered] women."47 It is clear 
that in California BWS expert testimony is admissible to convey 
this general information to the jury.48 
California's and most states' laws allow the expert to state 
her conclusion that the particular defendant in fact suffered from 
BWS at the time she killed her batterer.49 This is important, be-
41. See Fielder, 756 S.W.2d at 311. 
42. WALKER, supra note 30, at 96. 
43. ld. Describing what happened after incidents of battering by her husband, 
Rita Collins stated, "[a]fterward he'd soothe me, and I'd think, he's a good man. 
What did I do wrong?" Gibbs, supra note 3, at 38. 
44. CHARLES P. EWING, BATIERED WOMEN WHO KILL: PSYCHOLOGICAL 
SELF-DEFENSE AS LEGAL JUSTIFICATION 20 (1987). 
45. GILLESPIE, supra note 16, at 157-60. 
46. See Kinports, supra note 18, at 400-01. For example, women might remain 
in such relationships for economic reasons, or due to feelings of helplessness. 
47. See WALKER, supra note 31, at 101-02 ("Battered women come from all 
types of economic, cultural, religious, and racial backgrounds .... They are women 
like you. Like me."); Developments in the Law, supra note 2, at 1501 ("No segment 
of society is immune from this violence - battering is prevalent among every eco-
nomic, racial and ethnic group."). 
48. See People v. Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. 167 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989); MIGUEL MEN. 
DEZ, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE § 15.09, at 293 (1993); James O. Pearson, Jr., Annota-
tion, Admissibility of Expert or Opinion Testimony on Battered Wife or Battered 
Woman Syndrome, 18 A.L.R. 4TH 1153 (1982). 
49. Pearson, supra note 48, at 1153. However, the admission of such a conclu-
sion by the expert does not establish self-defense, nor should the preclusion of this 
testimony bar a claim of self-defense. Women who kill should not have to prove 
both that they suffered from BWS and that they were justified in killing their batter-
ers. See Crocker, supra note 5, at 145-46. Nonetheless, the conclusion that the 
defendant is in fact a battered woman may still be necessary to avoid a situation in 
which jurors may conclude that since the expert did not say she suffered from BWS, 
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cause the general BWS testimony may be confusing to jurors un-
less the expert links this to the particular defendant. 
Furthermore, jurors will likely feel ill-equipped to determine 
whether the defendant suffered from BWS. For example, in her 
appeal, Ms. Aris argued that "Dr. Walker's inability to testify 
that appellant was a battered woman led at least one [juror]-the 
foreperson-to conclude that Ms. Aris did not [suffer from] the 
syndrome because they were not told she had the syndrome."5o 
However, beyond the uses of BWS testimony described above, it 
is not clear the extent to which an expert can testify as to the 
specific circumstances in which a particular defendant found her-
self. For example, it is not clear whether a BWS expert can state 
her opinion that the defendant honestly feared for her life when 
she killed her batterer, or that a reasonable woman in the de-
fendant's situation would have feared for her life and would have 
killed in self-defense. Most courts are wary of allowing such tes-
timony, fearing that the jury will adopt the expert's conclusion 
without analyzing the facts on its own.51 In addition to these evi-
dentiary issues surrounding BWS, California law has become 
muddled as to the definitions of "imminence" and "reasonable-
ness" within the context of self-defense law. The following sec-
tion explores these ambiguities, focusing on People v. Aris.52 
II. PEOPLE v. ARIS 
In Aris, a jury convicted the defendant of second degree 
murder for killing her sleeping husband.53 At trial, Ms. Aris tes-
tified to the violence and abuse to which her husband subjected 
her over the course of their ten-year marriage.54 She also testi-
fied that her husband had severely beaten her that evening and 
she must not have, and therefore, is not entitled to claim that she killed in self-
defense. 
50. Brief for Appellant at 104, People v. Aris, 215 Cal. App. 3d 1178 (1989) (No. 
EOO5418). 
51. E.g., Anne L. Braswell, Note, Resurrection of the Ultimate Issue Rule: Fed-
eral Rule of Evidence 704(b) and the Insanity Defense, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 620, 
621-22 (1987); Rick Brown, Note, Limitations on Expert Testimony on the Battered 
Woman Syndrome in Homicide Cases: The Return of the Ultimate Issue Rule, 32 
ARIZ. L. REv. 665 (1990). 
52. 264 Cal. Rptr. 167 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989). 
53. The trial court sentenced Ms. Aris to 15 years to life in prison. In June, 
1993, California Governor Pete Wilson reduced her sentence by making her eligible 
for parole one and a haIf years earlier than she would have been otherwise. Wilson's 
Cautious Clemency, SACRAMENTO BEE, June 4,1993, at B6. 
54. Arts, 264 Cal Rptr. at 171. 
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had threatened that he did not think he would let her live until 
the morning.55 The trial court permitted Ms. Aris to present gen-
eral expert testimony regarding BWS, that is, to describe the 
three cycles of violence and to explain why it is difficult for a 
battered woman to leave the relationship. However, the trial 
court did not allow the expert, Dr. Lenore E. Walker, to state her 
opinion that Ms. Aris suffered from BWS when she shot her hus-
band, nor to testify as to how Ms. Aris' "experiences as a bat-
tered woman affected her perceptions of danger, its imminence, 
and what actions were necessary to protect herself."56 Nor did 
the trial court instruct the jury on perfect self-defense; instead, it 
instructed the jury on imperfect self-defense and second degree 
murder. 
The court of appeal found that the trial court erred in these 
respects.57 The court found that the expert's opinion that the de-
fendant suffered from BWS was not barred by People v. Bled-
soe.58 In Bledsoe, an expert was not allowed to state that the 
rape victim suffered from "Rape Trauma Syndrome" (RTS) in 
the prosecution of the alleged rapist.59 The California Supreme 
Court determined in Bledsoe that it would be too prejudicial to 
allow the expert to conclude that since the victim exhibited the 
symptoms of RTS, the victim was in fact raped. Further, the 
court reasoned that there was no support that RTS could reliably 
prove whether a rape had been committed. In contrast, the de-
fendant in Aris sought the admission of the expert's opinion that 
she had been battered not to prove that her husband had com-
mitted a crime, but rather to support her claim of self-defense.6o 
The appellate court further found that Dr. Walker's proposed 
testimony regarding how Ms. Aris' experiences as a battered wo-
man affected her perceptions of danger and imminence were rel-
55. Brief for Appellant at 113, People v. Aris, 215 Cal. App. 3d 1178 (1989) (No. 
EOO5418). 
56. Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 180. 
57. While the reviewing court found that the trial court committed error, the 
court upheld Ms. Aris' conviction on the grounds that these errors were harmless. 
Id. at 180-82. 
58. 681 P.2d 291 (Cal. 1984) (holding that an expert could not opine, based 
upon the victim's behavior according to Rape Trauma Syndrome ("RTS"), that the 
victim had actually been raped, but finding the erroneous admission was harmless in 
this case). 
59. See also In re Sara M., 239 Cal. Rptr. 605 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that 
the expert could not testify, based upon Child Sexual Abuse Accomodation Syn-
drome, that the child had actually been abused). 
60. Aris,264 Cal. Rptr. at 181. 
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evant to the issue of whether Ms. Aris genuinely believed that it 
was necessary to defend herself, but emphasized that such testi-
mony could not be used to support the reasonableness of her use 
of self-defense.61 In other words, where a battered woman 
claims self-defense and presents expert BWS testimony, "trial 
courts should instruct [the jury] that such testimony is relevant 
only to prove the honest belief requirement for both perfect and 
imperfect self-defense, not to prove the reasonableness require-
ment for perfect self-defense."62 
Additionally, the appellate court determined that the trial 
court properly prohibited Dr. Walker from stating her opinion 
that Ms. Aris "actually perceived that she was in imminent dan-
ger and needed to kill in self-defense."63 The appellate court 
held that the expert's opinion regarding Ms. Aris' genuine and 
honest belief in the need for self-defense violated Penal Code 
section 29 which states that an expert "shall not testify as to 
whether the defendant had or did not have the required mental 
states, which include, . . . malice aforethought, for the crimes 
charged."64 The court then concluded that "having an actual per-
ception that one is in imminent danger negates malice afore-
thought, ... [therefore] Dr. Walker was properly prohibited from 
stating an opinion that the defendant actually perceived that she 
was in imminent danger and needed to kill in self-defense."65 
The court reached this conclusion based on two cases. First, 
in People v. Flannel,66 the California Supreme Court held that an 
honest, but unreasonable belief in the need for self-defense ne-
gates the malice aforethought element of murder as a matter of 
law, thus affirming the so-called "imperfect" or "partial" self-de-
fense doctrine. Without this analysis, a defendant who acted in 
self-defense under an honest but unreasonable belief of immi-
61. [d. ("[S]uch [expert testimony] is relevant only to prove the honest belief 
requirement . . . not to prove the reasonableness requirement for perfect self-
defense."). 
62. [d. (emphasis added). 
63. [d. 
64. CAL. PENAL CoDE § 29 (West 1988) (emphasis added). 
65. People v. Aris,264 Cal. Rptr. 167,180 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (citations omit-
ted). Contra, MENDEZ, supra note 48, at 393 n.24. 
66. 603 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1979). In Flannel, two men had a history of violent rela-
tions, and the defendant shot the victim after threatening him, but believing that he 
was reaching for a pocket knife. After shooting the victim, the defendant stated that 
the victim deserved to die and no one would care. [d. at 3. The Supreme Court held 
that the trial court did not err in failing to instruct the jury sua sponte on the "unrea-
sonable belief" doctrine. [d. at 8. 
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nent danger would be convicted of murder. Instead, under im-
perfect self-defense analysis such a situation would result in a 
negation of malice aforethought, reducing the conviction to 
manslaughter.67 
The doctrine of imperfect self-defense is somewhat analo-
gous to the "heat of passion" doctrine. Where a defendant kills 
in the heat of passion, the malice element required for murder is 
negated and the conviction is reduced to manslaughter.68 How-
ever, the analogy is not complete. California follows the com-
mon law definition of malice for murder as the absence of 
provocation.69 Thus, the absence of provocation may prove the 
existence of malice as a matter of law and of evidence.7o Self-
defense, on the other hand, is a justification, and its elements are 
separate from those of the crime charged. It is "in the nature of 
confession and avoidance;"71 the defendant admits she had the 
intent to kill, but she was justified in doing so because she had to 
protect herself from an imminent threat.72 The absence of a gen-
uine belief in the need to kill does not prove the existence of 
malice under California's definition of murder. An honest but 
unreasonable belief in the need for self-defense negates malice 
aforethought as a matter of law only by reducing the charge to 
manslaughter. Such an honest belief is simply inconsistent with 
the element of malice aforethought for murder, again, as a mat-
ter of law.73 The appellate court in Aris incorrectly relied on 
Flannel to support its conclusion that Penal Code section 29, a 
rule of evidence, barred Dr. Walker from stating her conclusion 
that Ms. Aris honestly feared for her life when she killed her 
husband. That conclusion is not related to a mental state re-
quired for the crime charged, as a matter of evidence; rather, it 
relates to the presence of an honest belief in the need for self-
defense. Therefore, it is not an element of the crime of murder, 
but instead supports an affirmative defense to murder. 
67. This has been called "imperfect self-defense." 
68. See CAL. PENAL CoDE § 192 (West 1994) ("[M]anslaughter is the unlawful 
killing ... without malice ... upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion."); id. § 195 
(Homicide is excused "when committed ... in the heat of passion."). 
69. Id. § 188. 
70. See JOHNSON, supra note 25, at 159-62. 
71. MENDEZ, supra note 48, § 15.09, at 393 n.24. 
72. Id. § 15.09, at 293. 
73. Despite recent arguments that either the legislature or the voters eliminated 
the doctrine of imperfect self-defense when they abolished diminished capacity, the 
California Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the doctrine in In re Christian S., 872 
P.2d 574 (Cal. 1994). 
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The second relevant case relied on by the appellate court in 
Aris, People v. Czahara,74 involved a defendant who claimed that 
he attempted murder in the "heat of passion upon provocation," 
and requested that the trial court allow his expert to so testify.75 
Relying on section 29 of the Penal Code, the trial court in 
Czahara held that the expert's opinion was not admissible be-
cause section 29 prohibits an expert from opining as to whether 
the defendant had or did not have the mental state required for 
the crime charged.76 Affirming, the appellate court stated that 
"[h]eat of passion upon sufficient provocation is not merely evi-
dence that malice was absent, it is by legal definition the absence 
of malice. To prove heat of passion and provocation is to prove 
that the defendant did not kill, or attempt to kill, with malice 
aforethought."77 Again, by statute the state can prove the malice 
element of murder by showing the absence of provocation or 
heat of passion. Therefore, where the expert states an opinion 
that the defendant acted in the heat of passion, the expert neces-
sarily states that the defendant "did not have the required mental 
state ... for [murder]."78 The expert opinion was offered to dis-
prove the element of malice required for murder, as a matter of 
evidence, thus the evidentiary rule set out in Penal Code section 
29 barred the testimony offered in Czahara.79 
Comparing Penal Code section 29 to a similar provision 
under the Federal Rules of Evidence is instructive in illustrating 
the erroneous analysis of the Aris court. Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 704(b) bars expert testimony as to the mental state of a 
criminal defendant in the form of "an opinion or inference as to 
whether the defendant did or did not have the mental state or 
condition constituting an element of the crime charged or a de-
fense thereto."80 The federal rule would more clearly bar the ad-
mission of an expert's opinion as to a defendant's honest belief in 
the need for self-defense, since this would be a mental state re-
74. 250 Cal. Rptr. 836 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988). 
75. [d. at 841. 
76. [d. at 842. The court pennitted the expert to testify as to the "profound 
agitation" and "emotional tunnoil" which "short circuited" the defendant's reason 
and judgment. Therefore, the court determined that even if Penal Code § 29 barred 
the expert from using the words "heat of passion," such testimony would not have 
resulted in a different verdict. Thus, the court affirmed Czahara's conviction for the 
attempted murder of his fonner girlfriend. [d. 
77. [d. at 841. 
78. CAL. PENAL CODE § 29 (West 1988). 
79. People v. Czahara, 250 Cal. Rptr. 836, 836 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988). 
80. FED. R. EVID. 704(b ) (emphasis added). 
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quired for a defense to the crime of murder. However, the Cali-
fornia version of this rule, Penal Code section 29, does not bar an 
expert's opinion testimony as to the defendant's mental state 
which relates to a claim of self-defense. Applying the above rea-
soning to Aris, under self-defense law, where the defendant of-
fers expert testimony that the defendant genuinely believed self-
defense was necessary, she is not attempting to disprove malice, 
as a matter of evidence. Rather, she seeks to support her affirm-
ative claim of perfect or imperfect self-defense as a matter of law 
only. 
The court in Aris relied on the Flannel court's affirmance of 
imperfect self-defense doctrine to support its determination that 
a defendant's actual belief in the need for self-defense proves the 
absence of malice. The court then also relied on the Czahara 
court's application of Penal Code section 29 to preclude testi-
mony that the defendant was not acting in the heat of passion 
since it proves the absence of malice. The Aris court incorrectly 
combined the analysis of these two cases and determined that 
since an honest but unreasonable belief in the need for self-de-
fense negates malice aforethought, the expert's opinion that the 
defendant had an honest belief violates section 29 of the Penal 
Code. Essentially, the court treated the existence of a genuine 
belief in the need for self-defense as disproof of malice afore-
thought as a matter of law and of evidence, thus subjecting it to 
the requirements of Penal Code section 29. The court's reason-
ing on this point is brief: "Since having an actual [honest] per-
ception that one is in imminent danger negates malice 
aforethought we hold that Dr. Walker was properly prohibited 
from stating an opinion that defendant actually perceived that 
she was in imminent danger and needed to kill in self-defense."81 
This analysis is incorrect. The existence of a genuine belief in the 
need for self-defense, while negating malice as a matter of law 
under the court's holding in Flannel, does not disprove malice as 
a matter of evidence. Evidence that the defendant killed in the 
heat of passion proves that the defendant did not kill with malice 
aforethought. However, evidence that the defendant killed in 
the actual belief in the need to defend herself does not prove the 
lack of malice aforethought. Rather, the defendant's actual be-
lief in the need for self-defense is an element of self-defense, not 
81. People v. Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. 167, 180 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (citations 
omitted). 
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an element of the crime of murder. Section 29 of the Penal Code 
applies in Czahara because the defendant sought to include the 
expert's opinion that the defendant attempted murder while act-
ing in the heat of passion to prove the lack of malice afore-
thought. Section 29 does not apply in Aris, since the expert's 
testimony that the defendant actually believed she had to kill 
would have supported her claim that she acted in self-defense, 
not to prove the absence of malice aforethought. Certainly, the 
effect of such evidence might negate malice as a matter of law 
under Flannel, but it would not disprove, as a matter of evidence, 
the lack of malice aforethought. Imperfect or partial self-defense 
is separate from the elements of murder, by definition because 
elements of self-defense do not disprove the element of malice 
aforethought required for murder. 
While the court in Flannel held that an honest but unreason-
able belief in the need for self-defense negates malice afore-
thought, the court emphasized that the doctrine of unreasonable 
belief is not "bound with or limited by concepts of . . . heat of 
passion."82 The California Supreme Court recently reiterated 
the separation of the doctrines of imperfect self-defense and di-
minished capacity in In re Christian S.83 The court held that stat-
utory amendments which sought to eliminate the defense of 
diminished capacity did not affect the doctrine of imperfect self-
defense.84 The court stated that while these doctrines can miti-
gate murder to manslaughter, imperfect self-defense is "in-
dependent of [heat of passion] and independent of diminished 
capacity."85 The court in Aris incorrectly linked heat of passion 
with imperfect self-defense in its application of Penal Code sec-
tion 29. The expert's opinion that the defendant honestly be-
lieved her life was in danger does not disprove the malice 
aforethought element of murder, but rather supports the defend-
ant's affirmative claim of self-defense. Therefore, section 29 is 
not intended to bar an expert's opinion that a battered woman 
honestly believed that she was in imminent danger. 
The appellate court also concluded that the trial court cor-
rectly excluded Dr. Walker's statement that in her "professional 
82. People v. Flannel, 603 P.2d 1, 5 (Cal. 1979); see also In re Christian S., 872 
P.2d 574, 579-80 (Cal. 1994) (rejecting the argument that imperfect self-defense was 
developed from diminished capacity and was therefore abolished by Proposition 8). 
83. 872 P.2d 574 (Cal. 1994). 
84. Id. at 578-80. 
85. Id. at 578. 
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opinion ... [Ms. Aris] had a reasonable perception of danger."86 
To support this conclusion, the Aris court delved into a discus-
sion distinguishing justification from excuse.87 The court stated 
that justification focuses on the defendant's act, while excuse fo-
cuses on the actor.88 Since self-defense is a justification, the 
court determined that it was only concerned with the reasonable-
ness of the defendant's conduct, not with the reasonableness of 
her mental processes. Therefore, according to the court, the ex-
pert's opinion that the defendant's belief in the need for self-de-
fense was reasonable is irrelevant.89 While there is a theoretical 
difference between excuse and justification, the distinction is not 
helpful where reasonableness is not a purely objective standard, 
but includes a consideration of the defendant's situation and the 
circumstances in which the defendant employed self-defense. 
In California, when a defendant claims that he acted in self-
defense, juries are instructed that the killing was justifed if the 
defendant "honestly and reasonably believe[d] ... [t]hat it was 
necessary under the circumstances to kill the other person to pre-
vent death or great bodily injury to herself."90 By instructing the 
jury on the amount of force a defendant might use to defend her-
self, a court tells a jury that a defendant "may use all force and 
means which she believes to be reasonably necessary and which 
would appear to a reasonable person, in the same or similar cir-
cumstances, to be necessary to prevent the injury which appears 
to be imminent."91 Circumstances which a jury may consider in-
clude prior acts of violence by the decedent against the defend-
ant.92 For example, in People v. Torres,93 the defendant claimed 
86. People v. Aris,264 Cal. Rptr. 167, 179 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989). While the ex-
pert might be permitted to state conclusions as to hypotheticals posed by the attor-
ney, unless the expert does not state a final conclusion linking those hypotheticals to 
the defendant being tried, jurors might be more confused. See Braswell, supra note 
51, at 635. This is similar to the situation where the expert is not permitted to state 
whether, in her professional opinion, she thinks that the defendant in fact suffered 
from BWS; jurors are likely to conclude that if the expert did not say so, she must 
not have. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
87. Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 178-79. 
88. [d. 
89. [d. 
90. CAUIC, CRIM. 5.12 (emphasis added). 
91. CAUIC, CRIM. 5.30 (emphasis added). 
92. People v. Torres, 210 P.2d 324, 326-28 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1949) (finding 
that it was reversible error for the court to fail to instruct the jury that they could 
consider the prior threats of violence by the decedent in evaluating the reasonable-
ness of the defendant's exercise of self-defense). 
93. [d. 
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that he thought the victim was reaching for a knife in his 
pocket.94 Although the defendant was mistaken, the court deter-
mined that a reasonable jury could find the defendant's mistake 
reasonable upon considering the prior threats by the decedent to 
the defendant.95 Therefore, the reasonableness prong of self-de-
fense includes not only the reasonableness of the act but also the 
reasonableness of the defendant's belief, or mental process, in 
evaluating the need for self-defense. 
Early in the Aris opinion itself, the court sets out the law of 
self-defense and states that one requirement of self-defense is 
that "a reasonable person in the same circumstances would have 
had the same perception and done the same acts."96 This sup-
ports the proposition that reasonable self-defense law is not con-
cerned only with the reasonableness of the defendant's actions 
but also with the reasonableness of her perception and belief in 
the need for self-defense. Therefore, expert testimony which 
links the circumstances of the battered woman defendant to the 
reasonableness of both her belief in the need to defend herself 
and her act of self-defense is relevant to her claim of self-defense. 
In sum, as to the evidentiary issues, the Aris court held that 
Penal Code section 29 bars a BWS expert from stating her opin-
ion that the defendant honestly believed her life was in danger. 
The court also held that the reasonableness of the defendant's 
belief is irrelevant, stating that the justification of self-defense is 
concerned only with the reasonableness of the defendant's act.97 
As a result of these holdings Ms. Aris was unable to present a 
claim of perfect self-defense, nor was she able to bolster her 
claim of imperfect self-defense. These holdings demonstrate how 
a court's narrowing of self-defense doctrine combined with its in-
correct application of evidentiary rules can make it impossible 
for ~ battered woman to get her claim of self-defense to a jury. 
In addition to the evidentiary holdings in Aris, the appellate 
court further precluded Ms. Aris' claim of self-defense by up-
holding unduly narrow applications of reasonableness and immi-
nence. The appellate court upheld the trial court's refusal to 
instruct the jury on perfect self-defense on the ground that the 
defendant's use of self-defense was unreasonable as a matter of 
94. Id. at 325-26. 
95. Id. at 327. 
96. People v. Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. 167, 172 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (emphasis 
added). 
97. Id. at 179. 
1994] BATTERED WOMAN'S SYNDROME 233 
law. The court reached this conclusion based on the evidence 
that Ms. Aris' husband-batterer was sleeping at the moment 
when she fired the gun at him, and no " 'jury composed of rea-
sonable men could have concluded that' a sleeping victim 
presents an imminent danger of great bodily harm."98 The 
court's conclusion that Ms. Aris' use of self-defense was unrea-
sonable as a matter of law precluded the jury from considering 
whether Ms. Aris' use of self-defense was, in fact, reasonable. 
Moreover, this holding illustrates the difficulty battered wo-
men have in presenting their claims of self-defense when they kill 
in a non-traditional confrontational setting.99 The issue of 
"whether the circumstances would cause a reasonable person to 
perceive the necessity of [self-defense] . . . , [is] normally [ a] 
question of fact for the trier of fact to resolve."loo While evi-
dence of abuse alone is insufficient to warrant an instruction on 
self-defense, in Aris the defendant testified that her husband had 
beaten her that evening and had threatened that he did not think 
he would let her live until morning.lOl She also presented expert 
testimony which explained how a woman who lives in a battering 
relationship may fear for her life in situations where others 
would not hold such a fear, to support the reasonableness of her 
use of self-defense against her sleeping batterer.102 The defend-
ant thus presented sufficient evidence from which a jury com-
posed of reasonable persons could have concluded that she acted 
in self-defense.103 A court should not take such a factual issue 
away from the jury except where a defendant has failed to pres-
ent any evidence to support an instruction. Furthermore, where 
a defendant has presented evidence to support a defense, the 
trial court should not "undertake to weigh the credibility"l04 of 
such evidence, since this is "a task exclusively relegated to the 
jury."105 
98. [d. at 176 (quoting People v. Flannel, 603 P.2d 1, 10 (Cal. 1979». 
99. See supra notes 5-11 and accompanying text. 
100. People v. Clark, 181 Cal. Rptr. 682 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982). 
101. Brief for Appellant at 113, People v. Aris, 215 Cal. App. 3d 1178 (1989) (No. 
E005418). 
102. [d. 
103. See People v. Flannel, 603 P.2d 1, 10 (Cal. 1979) (requiring trial courts to 
give requested instructions where a defendant presents substantial evidence to sup-
port the instruction). 
104. [d. at 8. 
105. [d.; see also Maguigan, supra note 20, at 439-42 (arguing that this proce-
dural issue is critical to the defendant's ability to get her claim of self-defense to a 
jury). 
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While the trial court did instruct the jury on imperfect self-
defense, the court's definition of "imminence" effectively pre-
cluded the jury from finding that the defendant believed she was 
confronted with an imminent threat.lOO The appellate court up-
held the trial judge's explanation that "[i]mminent peril, . . . 
means that the peril must have existed at the very time the fatal 
shot was fired."lo7 The effects of this instruction were several. 
First, the instruction focused the jury's attention on the moment 
at which Ms. Aris fired the gun. However, California law permits 
juries to consider evidence of prior threats by the deceased to the 
defendant in determining the honesty of the defendant's belief in 
the need to use self-defense.lo8 Second, the court's definition of 
"imminence" included the statement that "the peril must appear 
to the defendant as immediate and present and not prospective 
or even in the near future."l09 Use of the word "immediate," 
which connotes a much shorter time frame than "imminent,"lIO 
similarly precluded the jury from considering the years of vio-
lence and abuse which the decedent inflicted upon Ms. Aris. Fi-
nally, by not emphasizing the factual nature of the question of 
imminence,11l the court gave the impression that an absolute, or 
objective definition of "imminence" exists.1I2 
106. See Madden, supra note 16, at 30. The instruction equated "imminent" with 
"immediate": "[t]he peril must appear to the defendant as immediate and present 
and not prospective or even in the near future." People v. Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. 167, 
173 (Cal. ct. App. 1989). One juror later commented that "once [the judge] gave us 
his definition it was no longer a jury case; he decided the case." Madden, supra note 
16, at 30 n.121 (quoting Candy J. Cooper, Juror Tells of Pressure to Say Guilty, S.F. 
EXAMINER, Aug. 31, 1992, at A9). 
107. Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 172. (emphasis added). 
108. People v. Pena, 198 Cal. Rptr. 819, 826 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984). In Aris, the 
jury initially had been instructed to consider Mr. Aris' prior threats to and abuse of 
Ms. Aris to determine whether she honestly believed she had to defend herself. 
However, this came before the jury began deliberations. On at least three occasions, 
the jury interrupted their deliberations to request more instruction on the definition 
of "imminence"; however, they were not reinstructed specifically on the effect of 
prior violence by the decedent. Brief for Appellant at 136-137, People v. Aris, 215 
Cal. App. 3d 1178 (1989) (No. EOO5418). 
109. Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 173. (emphasis added). 
110. See State v. Hundley, 693 P.2d 475, 477-81 (Kan. 1985) (holding that the use 
of "immediate" rather than "imminent" to describe the feared danger improperly 
limited the jury's consideration of prior abuse of the defendant by the decedent). 
111. See People v. Torres, 210 P.2d 324 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1949). 
112. This is illustrated by the fact that the jury asked the court whether "there [is] 
a length of time for [imminence]? Hours, days?" The court responded with "[t]hat's 
something you'll have to decide." Brief of Appellant at 127, People v. Aris, 215 Cal. 
App. 3d 1178 (1989) (No. EOO5418). 
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Essentially, the court's definition of "imminence" required 
the jury to find that Ms. Aris acted out of fear of a danger or 
threat which would have appeared imminent to a reasonable per-
son. However, if the jury had so concluded, they would have de-
termined that Ms. Aris had acted in complete self-defense.113 
The appellate court's affirmance indicates that the definition of 
"imminence" is the same whether the defendant claims perfect 
self-defense, or claims that she acted upon an honest but unrea-
sonable belief in the need for self-defense.114 However, in Flan-
nel, the court stated that "[i]t is the honest belief of imminent 
peril that negates malice."115 An honest perception that an im-
minent danger exists, even if not imminent to a reasonable per-
son, is what distinguishes imperfect from perfect self-defense. 
Thus, the court in Aris erroneously defined "imminence" in the 
context of imperfect self-defense. If the jury in Aris believed 
that Ms. Aris honestly feared for her life, they should have con-
victed her of manslaughter rather than second degree murder; 
Ms. Aris should not have been required to convince the jury that 
the danger was also imminent to a reasonable person.116 The 
trial court's definition of "imminence" and its determination of 
unreasonable self-defense as a matter of law, in addition to the 
court's evidentiary holdings, hindered Ms. Aris' ability to fully 
present her claims of perfect and imperfect self-defense and led 
to an unfair conviction of second-degree murder. 
III. LEGISLATIVE ACTIONS 
As mentioned earlier, the California Legislature has at-
tempted to remedy the problems faced by women like Ms. Aris 
from two angles. Initially, California lawmakers opted for an evi-
113. However, as discussed earlier, the jury was not instructed on perfect self-
defense. 
114. People v. Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. 167, 172-73 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989). 
115. People v. Flannel, 603 P.2d 1, 7 (Cal. 1979) (emphasis added). The court in 
Flannel also quoted People v. Lewis, 9 Cal. Rptr. 263, 270 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1960), 
which found that the trial court erred by refusing to instruct on manslaughter, stat-
ing "[a] jury might wen find that defendant was acting in [genuine] fear, but that 
under the circumstances [where the deceased was unconscious when the defendant 
ran to get a hatchet], ... he was not acting in a reasonably founded belief of immi-
nent peril to life or great bodily harm." 
116. While the California Supreme Court has recently cited to the Aris definition 
of "imminence" in a claim of "imperfect self-defense," In re Christian S., 872 P.2d 
574,583 (Cal. 1994), the court failed to clarify that the focus must be on whether the 
defendant feared an imminent danger to her life, not whether a reasonable person 
would have perceived an imminent danger. 
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dentiary approach and, in 1991, added section 1107 to the Evi-
dence Code, providing for the admission of expert testimony 
regarding BWS in criminal cases.117 The provision provides, in 
part, that: 
expert testimony is admissible by either the prosecution or the 
defense regarding battered women's [sic] syndrome, including 
the physical, emotional, or mental effects upon the beliefs, 
perceptions, or behavior of victims of domestic violence, ex-
cept when offered against a criminal defendant to prove the 
occurrence of the act ... of abuse which form the basis of the 
criminal charge.llS 
Section 1107 clearly addresses any potential objections that BWS 
testimony is unreliable scientific evidence, stating that "[e]xpert 
opinion testimony on battered women's [sic] syndrome shall not 
be considered a new scientific technique whose reliability is un-
proven."119 Thus, where the defendant can establish that the tes-
timony is relevant, and that the expert is otherwise qualified, 
section 1107 permits an expert to testify that the woman suffered 
from BWS when she killed her batterer.12o 
However, it is not clear whether section 1107 allows an ex-
pert to state an opinion as to the honesty of the defendant's be-
lief that it was necessary to kill her batterer to avoid death or 
great bodily injury. Certainly, such testimony is relevant to this 
element of self-defense, but section 1107 does not expressly indi-
cate whether such testimony is barred by section 29 of the Penal 
Code as the Aris court determined. Nor does section 1107 indi-
cate whether an expert's opinion that a reasonable woman in the 
defendant's circumstances would have also employed self-de-
fense is irrelevant, as Aris held. 
Evidence Code section 1107 suggests that the Legislature 
has overruled the Aris court's interpretation of Penal Code sec-
tion 29 as barring an expert's opinion that the defendant actually 
believed she had to kill. Evidence Code 1107(d) states "[t]his 
section is intended as a rule of evidence only and no substantive 
change affecting the Penal Code is intended." Penal Code sec-
tion 29 is not a substantive rule of law. Rather, it is a rule of 
evidence in criminal cases, barring expert opinion testimony as to 
whether a defendant had or did not have a particular state of 
117. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1107 (West Supp. 1993). 
118; [d. § 1107(a). 
119. [d. § 1107(b). 
120. This appears to codify the Aris court's finding that failure to allow the ex-
pert to state such an opinion is error. 
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mind required for an offense charged. The report of the Assem-
bly Committee on Public Safety cites as "current law" section 29 
and the Aris holding that BWS is relevant to prove the honesty 
of a defendant's belief.121 The report then states that this bill 
would authorize the admissibility of expert BWS testimony.l22 
In addition, one version of section 1107 would have included lan-
guage that the legislature did not intend to affect the holding in 
Aris ,123 but this was dropped in a subsequent amendment.124 
The legislative history is rather vague as to the precise effect of 
section 1107, nonetheless, these comments indicate that the Leg-
islature was examining both the Aris opinion and Penal Code 
section 29 when it considered section 1107. Since the Aris court 
relied on Penal Code section 29 to bar an expert's opinion as to 
the honesty of a defendant's belief in the need for self-defense, 
the report's statement that BWS evidence is admissible under 
section 1107 would imply that even if Penal Code section 29 ap-
plies,l25 Evidence Code section 1107 is an exception.126 
As to an expert's opinion that the defendant's belief in the 
need for self-defense was reasonable, the Senate Committee on 
the Judiciary's report on the penultimate version of section 1107 
states that the new section would allow expert opinion testimony 
which is "related to a subject that is sufficiently beyond common 
experience that the opinion of the expert would assist the trier of 
the fact."127 This language is similar to the Aris court's rationale 
that expert testimony that the defendant's belief in the need for 
self-defense was reasonable is irrelevant because reasonableness 
is not beyond the jury's common experience.128 Since this was 
not subsequently altered, it appears that section 1107 codifies this 
aspect of the Aris holding, barring an expert from stating an 
121. REpORT OF THE CALIFORNIA AsSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, 
Cal. AB. 785, 1991-92 Reg. Sess. 1 (1991). 
122. [d. 
123. Cal. AB. 785, 1991-92 Reg. Sess. § 2 (stating that "[ilt is the intent of the 
Legislature that this act not abrogate the holding of People v. Aris, 215 Cal. App. 3d 
1178"). 
124. [d. 
125. See supra notes 66-85 and accompanying text for the argument that Penal 
Code § 29 does not apply. 
126. See MENDEZ, supra note 48, at 293 n.24 (stating that "section 1107 could be 
seen as creating an exception to section 29"). 
127. CALIFORNIA SENATE CoMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, Cal. AB. 785, 1991-92 
Reg. Sess. 3-4 (1991). 
128. People v. Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. 167, 179 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989). 
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opinion that the defendant reasonably believed that she had to 
defend herself. 
Section 1107, however, does not clarify whether the jury may 
consider general BWS testimony when assessing the reasonable-
ness of a defendant's use of self-defense. In Aris, the court em-
phasized that while general expert BWS testimony is admissible, 
a jury should not use such testimony to establish whether a de-
fendant's use of self-defense was reasonable.129 While no cases 
have yet directly applied section 1107, in People v. Romero,130 an 
appellate court pointed to the new section to bolster its conclu-
sion that the defendant had been denied effective assistance of 
counsel when her attorney did not investigate the possibility of 
introducing BWS evidence to support her defense of duress. The 
court stated "the [expert BWS] evidence is relevant to the wo-
man's credibility and to support her testimony that she enter-
tained a good-faith objectively reasonable and honest belief that 
her act was necessary to prevent an imminent threat of greater 
harm."131 
The court's reasoning in Romero makes sense. Evidence 
that a defendant has been subjected to abuse is one of the cir-
cumstances which a jury should consider in evaluating the rea-
sonableness of a defendant's conduct and perception, just as a 
history of bad relations or violence between a defendant and a 
victim is relevant to the element of reasonableness in other 
cases.132 Certainly, in other instances, the jury is told to consider 
context when evaluating the reasonableness of the defendant's 
conduct and beliefs.133 Thus, while codifying the admissibility of 
expert BWS testimony, section 1107 should have specifically 
stated that such testimony could be considered by a jury in evalu-
ating the honesty and reasonableness of the defendant's belief in 
the need to use deadly force, and should have explicitly over-
ruled this holding of Aris. 
Pending Senate Bill 1144 (SB 1144), introduced in the Cali-
fornia Legislature's 1993-1994 Regular Session, recognizes that 
the "current law of justifiable self-defense ... is too narrowly 
129. Id. at 180-81; see also supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
130. 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 332, 338-42 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that section 1107 
did not apply to cases tried before its enactment). 
131. [d. at 338-39 (emphasis added). 
132. People v. Torres, 210 P.2d 324 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1949) (holding that fail-
ure to instruct on prior threats of violence was reversible error). 
133. See Madden, supra note 16, at 28. 
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drawn to allow . . . a fair trial [for victims of domestic vio-
lence]."134 In situations where a battered woman resorts to 
deadly force to defend herself: 
current law of justifiable homicide, ... does not allow these 
women to claim self-defense because the practical effect of the 
"reasonable person" standard imposed upon jurors [which] re-
sults in their finding that [battered] women are not entitled to 
justifiable homicide defenses because they did not attempt to 
escape what they actually perceived as imminent danger.135 
Despite these laudable findings, the proposed new law does not 
alter the definition of a "reasonable person" nor does it change 
the definition of "imminence." 
SB 1144 proposes three additions to the Penal Code. First, 
SB 1144 appears to codify the "honest but unreasonable belief" 
doctrine in People v. Flannel,136 by adding the following language 
to the definition of manslaughter:137 "the intentional killing of a 
human being when, at the time of the killing, the person who kills 
has an honest but unreasonable belief in the necessity to defend 
against imminent peril to life or great bodily injury."138 This 
could prevent future challenges to the court-created doctrine of 
imperfect self-defense. 
The second addition proposed by SB 1144 creates a new and 
separate justification for victims of domestic violence who kill 
their batterers. Section 198.7 of the bill provides that one who 
"has been subjected to a history or pattern of repeated willful 
infliction of corporeal injury resulting in a traumatic condition, or 
a victim of rape, sodomy, or repeated sexual abuse by the dece-
dent,"139 is justified in killing the abuser if she honestly believed 
"that there was imminent danger that the decedent would kill or 
inflict great bodily injury on the person, . . . [and] that it was 
necessary under the circumstances to use deadly force."140 The 
defendant also must have believed "at the time he or she used 
deadly force ... that [she] was a victim of felony false imprison-
134. Cal. S.B. 1144, supra note 3, § 1(f). 
135. Id. § l(e). 
136. 603 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1979); see supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
137. CAL. PENAL CODE § 192 (West 1994). 
138. Cal. S.B. 1144, supra note 3, § l(e) (emphasis added). The California 
Supreme Court recently relied, in part, on this section of SB 1144 in finding that 
1981 amendments to several sections of the Penal Code, while eliminating the de-
fense of diminished capacity, did not alter the doctrine of imperfect or partial self-
defense. In re Christian S., 872 P.2d 574, 582 (Cal. 1994). 
139. Cal. S.B. 1144, supra note 3, § 3(b) (adding Penal Code § 198.7(b». 
140. Id. (adding Penal Code § 198.7(c». 
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ment."141 At first blush, this change appears to permit a battered 
woman to present ,a claim of perfect self-defense based only on 
her honest belief in the need to defend herself, and a showing 
that she was a victim of felony false imprisonment, thus eliminat-
ing the need for her to additionally prove that she reasonably 
feared for her life. However, closer examination reveals 
otherwise. 
The final addition to the Penal Code defines felony false im-
prisonment as a situation in which "the victim ... is intentionally 
and unlawfully restrained or confined by violence or express or 
implied threats of harm, by word or act, which threats cause the 
victim to fear harm, ... and that fear is not unreasonable."142 
The effect of the last two changes is not entirely clear. The pro-
posed addition of section 198.7 to the Penal Code seems to pro-
vide that where a defendant has been in a battering relationship 
and the victim of felony false imprisonment, use of self-defense 
may be justified based on only the honest belief in the need for 
self-defense. This reading of proposed section 198.7 would elimi-
nate the requirement of reasonableness for victims of the double-
felony of physical or sexual abuse and false imprisonment. This 
would change current self-defense law tremendously, making the 
standard entirely subjective and eliminating any requirement 
that the battered defendant show that her use of self-defense was 
reasonable. Battered women who kill in non-traditional con-
frontational situations thus would have a much fuller opportunity 
to prove that their conduct was justified. 
However, a defendant claiming justification under proposed 
section 198.7 must also show that she believed that she was a 
victim of felony false imprisonment.143 The proposed addition of 
section 237.1 to the Penal Code defines felony false imprison-
ment as a situation in which "the victim ... is intentionally and 
unlawfully restrained or confined by violence or express or im-
plied threats of harm, by word or act, which threats cause the 
victim to fear harm, or injury to ... herself ... and that fear is not 
141. Id. (adding Penal Code § 198.7(d)). 
142. Id. (adding Penal Code § 237.1). 
143. Id. § 3(d). The California Alliance Against Domestic Violence 
("CAADV") disagrees with an approach which focuses on "imprisonment" as the 
reason women remain in such relationships, arguing that fear of violence is only one 
reason. Also, CAADV disagrees with the requirement that a defendant battered 
woman come forward with evidence corroborating their claims of abuse. Nina Mar-
tin, Reasonable Women, CAL. LAW., Mar. 1994, at 58, 62-63. 
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unreasonable.144 This specification, that the victim's fear of harm 
not be unreasonable, seems to indirectly incorporate a reasona-
bleness standard into the new definition of justification set out in 
proposed section 198.7. Under proposed section 198.7, the de-
fendant must have genuinely believed that she was a victim of 
felony false imprisonment; however, false imprisonment requires 
that the victim's fear of harm be reasonable. 
One possible interpretation is that the reasonableness re-
quirement is relevant only to prove that the batterer is guilty of 
false imprisonment. A batterer may not be found guilty based 
only on the genuine belief of the woman that she was a victim of 
false imprisonment; her fear must also be reasonable. Certainly, 
this makes sense. However, where the defendant is the battered 
woman, rather than the batterer, a court could find that the rea-
sonableness of a woman's fear required for false imprisonment is 
incorporated into the new definition of justification, since pro-
posed section 198.7 makes no mention of reasonableness. If this 
is so, a battered woman who kills in a non-traditional confronta-
tional setting will most likely be unable to prove that her fear was 
reasonable, just as Ms. Aris was unable to do. While SB 1144 
proclaims that the "reasonable person" standard is the problem, 
it should either explicitly eliminate the reasonableness require-
ment, or codify a requirement that juries be instructed to con-
sider evidence of BWS when they evaluate the reasonableness of 
the defendant's fear. 
Proposed changes to the definitions of both voluntary man-
slaughter and justification require that the defendant still have an 
honest belief in the need to defend against an imminent danger. 
The Ads court held that the definition of "imminence" is the 
same for both perfect and imperfect self-defense claims.145 The 
court concluded that regardless of whether the defendant hon-
estly perceived an imminent danger, the danger must have been 
actually imminent in order to support the defendant's claim of 
imperfect self-defense. The proposed changes to manslaughter 
and justification do not alter the definition of imminence as set 
forth by the appellate court in Aris. A future battered woman 
defendant who has killed in a non-traditional confrontational set-
ting similar to that of Ms. Aris, would nonetheless have to prove 
that the danger to her was actually imminent, not simply that she 
144. Cal. S.B. 1144, supra note 3 (adding Penal Code § 237.1). 
145. See supra notes 98-105 and accompanying text. 
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believed that she was in imminent danger from her sleeping bat-
terer (to prevail under either the new definition of justification or 
the new definition of manslaughter). Without a change to the 
Aris court's definition of "imminence," despite the good inten-
tions of the Legislature, a woman who kills in a non-traditional 
confrontational setting will be guilty of second-degree murder. 
Rather than create a separate justification for women who 
kill their batterers in the context of an abusive relationship, it 
makes more sense to remedy the erroneous definition of "immi-
nence" set forth in Aris, with respect to imperfect self-defense. 
As discussed at the beginning of this essay, the problems 
presented by situations in which battered women kill their sleep-
ing batterers are not necessarily due to the construct of self-de-
fense law, but rather, as illustrated by the holdings of the Aris 
court, are due to the unduly restrictive manner in which courts 
apply self-defense elements to battered women. Rather than for-
mulate a separate law of self-defense, it would be better to enact 
legislation which corrects the narrowing effected by the Aris 
court. 
Under SB 1144, the main difference between finding volun-
tary manslaughter or justification is a matter of substantiating the 
defendant's situation. First, to prove justification, a battered wo-
man must corroborate her claim that her abuser subjected her to 
a pattern of repeated corporeal injury. Corroborating evidence 
must be "sufficient to substantiate enough of the [defendant's] 
testimony to establish his or her credibility."l46 In most situa-
tions, there are witnesses who can testify that the defendant has 
been subjected to such abuse, or there are medical records to 
support her claim of abuse. Interestingly, when defendants not 
suffering from battered woman syndrome claim self-defense, 
their testimony alone may be sufficient to support the defense.147 
Second, to justify a killing, a defendant must prove that she hon-
estly believed that she was a victim of felony false 
imprisonment.148 
Another pending bill combines the evidentiary and substan-
tive changes described above. Assembly Bill 947 would amend 
Evidence Code section 1107 to include the following subdivision: 
In any case in which a defendant charged with murder under 
section 187 of the Penal Code, or manslaughter under section 
146. Cal. S.B. 1144, supra note 3, § 3(b) (adding Penal Code § 198.7). 
147. See Martin, supra note 143, at 86. 
148. See supra notes 142-45 and accompanying text. 
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192 of the Penal Code, raises as a defense, partial or complete 
justification, or excuse ... the defendant, in order to establish 
the defendant's reasonable belief that the use of deadly force 
was necessary to defend against imminent peril to life or great 
bodily injury, shall be permitted to offer relevant evidence 
pursuant to this section that the defendant had been the victim 
of acts of domestic violence ... by the deceased.149 
243 
Because this proposed change would allow BWS expert testi-
mony to establish the reasonableness of a defendant's use of self-
defense, it requires courts to instruct the jury to consider this evi-
dence when evaluating her self-defense claim. Also, a court 
could not determine that a battered woman's use of self-defense 
was unreasonable as a matter of law and refuse to instruct on 
perfect self-defense, as Aris held. By requiring the admission of 
BWS evidence to support reasonableness, the legislation would 
necessarily limit the judge's ability to determine unreasonable-
ness as a matter of law whenever the defendant introduces evi-
dence that she was the victim of domestic violence. 
While this proposal combines BWS evidence with substan-
tive law, it nonetheless fails to address the issue of how courts 
should define "imminence." Assembly Bill 947 would also 
amend the law of manslaughter by adding section 192.1, similar 
to the change proposed by Senate Bill 1144, to state that one who 
kills in the "honest but unreasonable belief in the necessity to 
defend against imminent peril" is guilty of manslaughter.150 Like 
Senate Bill 1144, Assembly Bill 947 does not require that a dan-
ger actually be imminent for a jury to convict only of manslaugh-
ter, rather it is sufficient if the defendant honestly believed that 
the danger was imminent, given her history of abuse. Without 
making such clarification, again, a battered woman who kills in a 
non-traditional confrontational situation will be found guilty of 
second-degree murder, as Ms. Aris was, because she will be un-
able to convince the jury that her sleeping batterer presented an 
actual imminent danger. The legislature should clarify that a 
claim of imperfect self-defense should lead to manslaughter if the 
jury finds that a defendant honestly believed she was in imminent 
danger of death or serious bodily injury, whether or not she was 
149. Cal. A.B. 947,1993-94 Reg. Sess. § led) (amending CAL. EVID. CODE 1107) 
(emphasis added). 
150. [d. § 2(a) (adding Penal Code § 192.1). In addition, Assembly Bill 947 pro-
vides that a defendant in the above situation would be guilty of voluntary man-
slaughter if she manifests an intent to kill, while one who does not manifest such an 
intent would only be guilty of involuntary manslaughter. [d. § 2(a)(1), (2). 
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actually in such danger, or a reasonable person would have be-
lieved the danger was not imminent. 
I acknowledge that most battered women do not kill their 
batterers while they sleep.151 Furthermore, I do not believe that 
a separate defense for battered women who kill is necessary or 
even a good idea. However, given the narrowing of self-defense 
law by the appellate court in Aris, the California Legislature 
should attempt to ensure that such battered women defendants 
are able to present fully their claim of self-defense to the jury. 
Therefore, I applaud the California Legislature's recent remedial 
attempts. Nonetheless, the focus should not be on creating a sep-
arate defense for battered women, but rather on setting forth 
definitions of "imminence" and "reasonableness" which would 
allow a jury to consider the facts and effects of such abuse in 
evaluating both the imminence of the danger presented by the 
abuser, as well as the reasonableness of the defendant's belief in 
the need for self-defense. 
While Evidence Code section 1107 eliminated several obsta-
cles to the admission of BWS evidence,152 a battered woman may 
still be denied a fair opportunity to present a claim of self-de-
fense to a jury since section 1107 does not require courts to in-
struct the jury that this evidence is relevant to whether the 
defendant's use of self-defense was reasonable. The changes to 
self-defense law proposed by SB 1144 are ill-advised in that they 
create a separate law for battered women who kill their batterers. 
Furthermore, SB 1144 does not correct the narrowing of the ele-
ment of imminence effected by the court in Aris. Nor would sim-
ply redefining the element of imminence be sufficient. Without 
the use of expert testimony, most jurors will not find that the 
defendant is acting in self-defense when she kills in a non-tradi-
tional confrontational setting. California is on its way to remedy-
ing this problem, but emphasis should not be on creating a new 
law of self-defense, but rather on expressly permitting juries to 
consider BWS evidence in their evaluation of reasonableness, 
and clarifying the definition of "imminent danger" when a de-
fendant relies on imperfect self-defense. 
151. See Maguigan, supra note 20, at 397. The author analyzed 223 incidents of 
battered women who killed their batterers and found that twenty percent of the 
killings were done in "nonconfrontational" situations. Four percent of these were 
"contract killings", eight percent were "sleeping batterers", and in eight percent of 
the incidents, the defendant was the "initial" aggressor during a lull in the violence. 
Id. 
152. See supra notes 117-20 and accompanying text. 
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The California Legislature should adopt section one of AB 
947 as it amends section 1107 of the Evidence Code.153 In addi-
tion, I suggest amending section 29 of the Penal Code to add the 
following language: This section does not prohibit an expert 
from testifying as to whether the defendant had or did not have 
the required mental states to support an affirmative defense 
which include duress and self-defense. This would remedy the 
Aris court's incorrect interpretation of Penal Code section 29 as 
a bar to an expert's testimony that the defendant honestly be-
lieved she was in imminent danger of death or serious bodily 
injury. 
Further, the legislature should adopt the following proposed 
section 192.1 of the Penal Code: In addition to section 192, man-
slaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being when, at the 
time of the killing, the person who killed honestly believed that 
he or she was in imminent danger of death or great bodily injury 
and honestly believed that he or she had to defend himself or 
herself, even if the danger was not actually imminent or even if a 
reasonable person would not have believed such danger was im-
minent. This amendment would remedy the incorrect definition 
of imminence with respect to imperfect self-defense. It would 
also clarify an important distinction between perfect and imper-
fect self-defense. Perfect self-defense requires the defendant to 
show that a reasonable person in her situation would have be-
lieved the danger to be imminent, while under the doctrine of 
imperfect self-defense, a defendant need only show that she hon-
estly believed the danger was imminent. 
Such changes to the Evidence Code and to the Penal Code 
will, without creating a separate law of self-defense for battered 
women, provide such women who kill their batters with a better 
opportunity to present claims of perfect and imperfect self-de-
fense within the context of traditional self-defense law. 
153. See supra note 149 and accompanying text. 
